In 2022, the U.S. began standardising post-quantum encryption, anticipating a threat that does not yet fully exist. This decision reflects a broader shift in the tech policy sphere: governments are preparing for a future in which control over information processing defines power. And yet, as this race accelerates, a deeper question emerges — not merely who will lead in quantum capability, but who will be left behind, and what that divide will mean for the global distribution of power.
Quantum computing sits at the centre of this shift, as it not only improves computational speed, but fundamentally changes how information is processed. Quantum systems exploit superposition and entanglement to evaluate multiple states simultaneously, allowing them to solve problems that would take classical systems impractically long to compute. These capabilities extend beyond science into security, economics, and governance; in fields such as pharmaceutical drug discovery, where quantum simulation could model molecular interactions with unprecedented precision, and financial modelling, where real-time optimisation across vast datasets stands to reshape entire markets.
Encryption illustrates these stakes clearly: modern digital systems rely on public-key encryption, which depends on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. A sufficiently advanced quantum computer could, in principle, break these systems using algorithms such as Shor’s. Current machines cannot do this — practical implementation would require millions of error-corrected qubits, far beyond existing capabilities. Yet the expectation of this future capability already shapes present decisions. Institutions such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology are developing post-quantum cryptographic standards in anticipation. Anticipation alone has become a strategic force in the geopolitical landscape, demonstrating that the true power of quantum technology is in what it is expected to do tomorrow, and who will be positioned to act when that moment arrives.
Governments in the U.S. and China have committed billions of dollars to quantum research, recognising its long-term strategic value, according to the Congressional Research Service and data obtained from the OECD. These centres attract researchers, funding, and collaboration networks, and each element strengthens the others, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of advantage. This advantage compounds — better information systems improve decision-making, which improves resource allocation, which further strengthens those systems. Knowledge concentration, then, does not merely reflect the divide; it is the mechanism through which the divide deepens. Countries outside this system — particularly developing countries — struggle to build independent capacity and get left behind.
Economic consequences follow directly, as countries that lead in quantum research will come to influence industries built on advanced computation, including pharmaceuticals, materials science, and artificial intelligence. These sectors depend on solving complex optimisation and simulation problems — such as modelling protein folding to accelerate drug development, simulating novel materials for energy storage, or rapidly optimising supply chains at scales impossible for classical systems. Quantum advantage in these areas translates directly into industrial and commercial advantage. Countries without access to these tools may find themselves dependent on external systems they neither own nor control, deepening patterns of technological dependency.
Egypt reflects this challenge in concrete terms. Public spending on research and development remains below 1 per cent of GDP, compared to over 2 to 3 per cent in leading economies. Egyptian universities graduate strong students in physics and engineering, yet many pursue postgraduate study or careers abroad, particularly in Europe and North America. This outward flow of talent limits the formation of local research ecosystems in advanced fields such as quantum technologies. Capacity erodes through the absence of sustained investment and opportunity, and through structural conditions that make remaining, let alone competing, increasingly difficult.
It is important to note that some countries have adapted to technological change by leapfrogging earlier stages of development. M-Pesa in Kenya offers a clear example, where mobile banking bypassed traditional financial infrastructure entirely, enabling millions of people to access financial services for the first time without a single physical bank account. A similar approach in quantum technology would require far more deliberate strategy, given the depth of the scientific and industrial foundations involved. This is where international research partnerships, open-source quantum software platforms, and targeted education programmes could provide meaningful entry points. These steps would not eliminate the gap, but they would allow broader participation in shaping its trajectory.
Technical discussions often focus on qubit counts and experimental milestones, which measure and track progress, but do not capture its full implications. To frame quantum advancement purely in terms of hardware benchmarks is to miss the structural dimension of what is occurring: quantum development functions less as a scientific milestone and more as a geopolitical threshold. Those who define the metrics of success also define who counts as having achieved it — and without broader inclusion in setting these standards, many countries will find themselves evaluated by benchmarks they had no hand in creating. The divide it creates will not emerge suddenly, but instead through a gradual accumulation of asymmetries — in funding, in talent, in infrastructure, and in the institutional capacity to understand and respond to what quantum technology will make possible. And it is already forming through decisions about research investment, educational access, and international collaboration.
Quantum technology is a structural shift in how power forms and operates, and the conversation around it must reflect that.
