On 6 August 2025, Karol Nawrocki officially took Poland’s presidential office, two years after a center-left coalition put an end to the Law and Justice (PiS) party’s eight-year spell in power. PiS’s reign was marked by corruption scandals and a crawl towards autocracy. In December 2017, the European Commission observed that: “The executive and legislative branches have been systematically enabled to politically interfere in the composition, powers, administration and functioning of the judicial branch.” Throughout those eight years, PiS enjoyed almost complete cooperation from Poland’s previous president, Andrzej Duda. Duda used his veto power 19 times during his tenure, 10 of which came during the brief cohabitation periods at the beginning of his first and end of his second term.
For comparison Nawrocki has rejected 17 bills in less than four months. That brings him to a veto rate of more than 15 per cent — compared to Duda's 1 per cent — and significantly higher than that of Lech Wałęsa, the Third Republic’s first president, whose veto rate of 6 per cent is second-highest.
Nawrocki’s love of the veto has become a serious issue for the current coalition government, which is expected to serve all of its term in a cohabitation environment. The frustration and diminishing patience of the Polish cabinet was made clear on 1 December, when, after yet another veto, Prime Minister Donald Tusk declared that he would advise his parliamentary majority to pass the Crypto Assets Market Act again without changing its shape at all. This is a bold strategy to move the bill forward, as the Polish constitution requires three-fifths of the lower chamber to override a veto — a feat that has been accomplished a mere 24 times in the Third Republic’s history.
Since December, the tensions inside the co-executive are only worsening. Nawrocki has proposed that the government consult him before even voting on bills, as “such action would streamline the legislative process.” Tusk responded by saying, “according to the Constitution, the government conducts foreign policy. The President is obliged to cooperate with the government and represent Poland with dignity.”
The foreign affairs minister had an even harsher response: “[Nawrocki] would like the government to ask him for permission to proceed with laws…there is not a shadow of legal basis for this. You should have read the constitution before deciding to run.” This exchange perfectly encapsulates the impasse at which the Polish constitutionally prescribed double executive finds itself. None of the statements above are factually incorrect, although Tusk’s response requires some clarification. His statement is correct but may be interpreted as misleading. The constitution requires the president’s cooperation only in the matters of international policy, therefore in any matter of internal policy, such as the legislative process, the president is not constitutionally obligated to cooperate.
Nawrocki is correct in saying that co-executive consultation would make the process easier and would reduce the number of vetoes. But it may be interpreted as conflicting with the constitution. The only powers during the legislative process that are vested in the president are the rights to sign, veto, or seek an opinion on constitutionality from the Constitutional Tribunal, and a right of legislative initiative. Any role regarding the debate and amendment process is the sole responsibility of the two chambers of parliament. The government may also amend the discussed legislation, unlike the president. The constitution strictly prohibits the president from being a member of any of the two chambers, an obvious argument that it is not intended for the president to be involved in this process.
Clearly there is an unprecedented amount of friction within the Polish co-executive but neither side is breaking the law. This gives reason to believe that the fault of this deadlock lies within the system itself.
The path for the Polish political class is unclear. A constitutional reform requires unprecedented political support, whereas upholding the status-quo is a serious reputational risk for the government, the president, and the country as a whole.
The current impasse shows that despite the system functioning within its constitutional bounds, it produces outcomes that few would describe as functional. And Poland cannot afford to project conflicting political signals abroad; Poland’s image has already suffered significantly during the years of PiS government, especially in relation to the EU. The current government has worked to repair that image, not least through its prominent role in Ukraine, but Poland cannot afford to squander that diplomatic capital because of a dysfunctional co-executive.
A possible solution could be the Italian model. Italian presidents have less powerful roles than their Polish counterparts, which would create a clearer chain of command, and reduce friction. Nawrocki’s camp is against this solution, instead calling for constitutional change where the balance of power is tilted to the president’s favour. His proposition shouldn’t be dismissed — regardless of his obvious personal incentive for such change — as it would also solve some of the power-balance related issues.
One should note however, that increasing the already significant role of the president would practically lead to a presidential, or very strong semi-presidential system like the French one, which would be a much bigger change for Polish politics than the aforementioned Italian model. For this reason, a pivot toward a more parliamentary model represents the structurally sounder and politically less radical path, although given the supermajority required for any constitutional change, even this more modest reform remains a distant prospect in the current political climate.
Before the 2027 elections, formal change remains unlikely. But the debate Nawrocki has now formally opened, whatever its political motivations, means the question of constitutional reform is no longer abstract. Poland's political class, and its citizens, will have to answer it sooner or later.
